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To respond to emerging and re-emerging infections, it is necessary to understand the 
interactions between microbial pathogens and their hosts and the impact of environmental 
and social factors on these interactions. The importance of understanding host-pathogen 
interactions is underscored by the emergence of virulent H5N1 avian influenza viruses and 
their transmission to humans, and the potential pandemic threat they pose.Infectious diseases have always 
afflicted mankind and always will. 
New infectious diseases emerge and 
old diseases re-emerge as microbes 
adapt to new hosts and new environ-
ments. To remain one step ahead 
of our pathogenic microbial foes, 
we must understand in detail how 
pathogens interact with their hosts, 
and how biological, environmental, 
and social factors combine to allow 
pathogens to infect new organisms. 
Deciphering each step in the different 
processes by which microbes adapt 
to new hosts is critical to develop-
ing effective countermeasures to 
detect, prevent, and treat infectious 
diseases. Our current efforts to pre-
pare for the unpredictable event of a 
possible global influenza pandemic 
and to minimize the burden of highly 
predictable, seasonal influenza epi-
demics exemplify the challenges of 
trying to keep up with and hopefully 
stay ahead of the influenza virus, a 
constantly evolving pathogen.
A Delicate Balance
Infectious diseases are the second 
leading cause of death throughout 
the world. In 2002, according to the 
World Health Organization (WHO, 
2002), more than a quarter of approx-
imately 57 million deaths worldwide 
were caused by infectious diseases. 
Millions of additional deaths are due 
to the secondary effects of infec-tions. Among people under the age 
of 50 years, infectious diseases 
are the leading cause of death and 
account for nearly one-third of all 
healthy years lost to illness (Morens 
et al., 2004). 
An estimated 75 percent of emerg-
ing infectious diseases in humans 
are zoonotic in origin, that is, they 
arise from microbes that infect other 
animals (Taylor et al., 2001). Most 
microbes have evolved to reach an 
equilibrium with their natural hosts 
without causing disease. However, 
factors such as economic develop-
ment and land use leading to pertur-
bations in the natural microbial envi-
ronment, human demographics and 
behavior, and international travel and 
commerce can create an imbalance 
in the established microbe-host equi-
librium and trigger the emergence 
of new infectious diseases. Human 
intrusion into settings such as rainfor-
ests has led to exposure of humans 
to viruses and other microbes that 
otherwise would not have occurred. 
For example, the practice of butch-
ering nonhuman primates for “bush-
meat” may be in part responsible for 
the “jumping” of HIV from its natural 
animal hosts to human hosts, as well 
as for the recent Ebola virus out-
breaks in Central Africa. The flow of 
rural populations into cities, urban 
poverty, and weakening of traditional 
family and social structures have Cell 124, Febled to increased sexual promiscuity, 
prostitution, and other practices that 
undoubtedly fueled the spread of HIV/
AIDS in Africa. An outbreak of Nipah 
virus in Malaysia occurred when 
pigs penned near fruit orchards con-
tracted the virus from the droppings 
of bats, whose habitat had shifted as 
a result of deforestation. The infected 
pigs readily transmitted the virus to 
their handlers. The spread of bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), 
or mad cow disease in cattle, and 
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
in humans, primarily in the United 
Kingdom, resulted from the practice 
of feeding cows grain containing the 
remains of scrapie-infected sheep 
(Morens et al., 2004).
New diseases do not emerge or 
re-emerge in a vacuum—they do 
so against a background of estab-
lished infectious diseases and 
host-microbe interactions that have 
existed for centuries. The diseases 
that make up this matrix were at 
some point emerging diseases that 
had never been previously observed 
in human populations but eventually 
became so entrenched in the popu-
lation that they became part of the 
background infectious disease bur-
den.  For example, in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, HIV/AIDS clearly 
was an emerging disease, but now 
it is an endemic matrix (background) 
disease. More recent examples of ruary 24, 2006 ©2006 Elsevier Inc. 665
Figure 1. Documented H5N1 Influenza Cases among Birds (Blue) and Humans (Orange) 2003–February 9, 2006newly emerging infectious diseases 
include Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS), Nipah virus 
encephalitis, Lassa fever, and most 
recently, human disease caused by 
the H5N1 strain of avian influenza 
virus. Infectious diseases that have 
previously occurred in humans also 
can re-emerge or resurge in different 
forms or in different environments. 
Examples include West Nile virus in 
the western hemisphere; monkey-
pox in the United States; dengue 
fever in Brazil, other parts of South 
and Central America, and even the 
Caribbean; and multidrug-resistant 
tuberculosis throughout the world 
(Morens et al., 2004). 
Humans and microbes coexist 
in a delicate balance amid an ever-
present tension. Microbes possess 
the ability to adapt naturally to their 666 Cell 124, February 24, 2006 ©2006 Ehosts, to their environment, and to 
new ecological niches offered to 
them as humans encroach upon 
their territory. They are also adept 
at circumventing efforts to suppress 
them, whether as a result of internal 
host pressures such as innate and 
adaptive immune responses or in 
reaction to external pressure applied 
by antibiotics, antivirals, or vaccines. 
In the face of our efforts to eliminate 
them, microbes almost always adapt 
successfully, thwarting our efforts to 
destroy them. 
Influenza
A prototypic example of the con-
stant struggle between microbes 
and man is the evolutionary success 
of influenza viruses as they adapt to 
their many hosts, including humans. 
Research to understand how influ-lsevier Inc.enza viruses coexist with hosts that 
serve as their natural reservoirs and 
attempts to delineate the factors that 
result in viruses adapting to new 
hosts and triggering disease serve 
at least two purposes. This informa-
tion is crucial to controlling yearly, 
seasonal influenza epidemics and 
preventing the devastation that may 
occur should a global influenza pan-
demic emerge. In addition, research 
into the natural evolution of influenza 
viruses and their adaptation to differ-
ent hosts may inform our efforts to 
understand other infectious diseases 
that emerge and re-emerge in unpre-
dictable ways. 
Influenza is fundamentally a recur-
ring background or matrix disease 
that usually re-emerges each year 
in a slightly different form (anti-
genic drift). However, it occasionally 
Figure 2. Possible Mode of H5N1 Avian 
Influenza Virus Transmission among 
Migratory Birds, Domestic Poultry, 
and Humans
Migratory birds harboring a low pathogenic 
strain of influenza virus are generally without 
symptoms of disease but can excrete virus. 
If a low pathogenic avian influenza A virus 
is transmitted to domestic poultry through 
direct or indirect contact or by exposure to 
fecal droppings, the virus can progressively 
mutate following passage from one suscep-
tible bird to the next. This is illustrated in the 
figure by the increase in the number of infec-
tious virions (green) following each passage of 
the virus from bird to bird until a mutant virus 
emerges that replicates to high levels and can 
kill the infected bird. Poultry harboring low 
pathogenic virus can make a full recovery, but 
those with highly pathogenic mutant forms of 
the virus almost always succumb to the virus 
and die. A highly pathogenic strain of H5N1 
avian influenza virus replicates more effi-
ciently and can be transmitted among poultry 
and from poultry to pigs and other mammals, 
including humans, through direct or indirect 
contact and via transport of infected poul-
try to other farms and markets. Susceptible 
migratory birds can become infected with 
the highly pathogenic mutant forms of the 
virus. Recently, migratory birds have started 
to show signs of disease from infection with 
the highly pathogenic H5N1 strain and may 
be able to transmit the more virulent virus to 
other birds, both wild and domestic, along 
their flight path, leading to rapid spread of the 
virulent virus.assumes a presentation as a newly 
emerging disease, very different 
from what the global society has 
previously experienced (antigenic 
shift). Seasonal influenza kills about 
250,000 to 500,000 people world-
wide each year, mostly older individ-
uals; in the United States, an average 
of 36,000 influenza-related deaths 
occur each year. In addition to the 
ever-present and largely predict-
able threat of seasonal influenza, the 
world also faces the threat of a much 
more unpredictable pandemic influ-
enza, caused by the emergence of a 
new strain of influenza virus to which 
humans have never been exposed. 
Over the past two years, the risk of 
an influenza pandemic has grown, as 
an exceptionally virulent form of the 
H5N1 avian influenza virus has circu-
lated widely among domestic poul-
try and wild migratory birds in Asia, 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and 
Africa. As of February 9, 2006, the virus also has infected more than 166 
people since late 2003, of whom half 
have died (WHO) (see Figure 1). 
Pandemics occur when a new 
influenza virus variant emerges to 
which the human population has no 
immunity. Influenza A viruses are 
most dangerous to humans because 
of their wide host range, their rapid 
mutation rate, and their capacity to 
cause serious disease (Wright and 
Webster, 2001). Influenza A subtypes 
are defined by the expression of two 
key surface proteins: hemagglutinin 
(H) and neuraminidase (N). Sixteen 
hemagglutinins are known to exist, 
each of which can be “paired” with 
one of nine neuraminidase proteins. 
These influenza A subtypes are all 
maintained in aquatic birds, which 
serve as a continual source of new 
viruses. A key factor in the possible 
emergence of an avian influenza 
virus as a human pandemic strain 
is the evolution and adaptation of Cell 124, Febthe virus to the human species. By 
understanding the etiology of previ-
ous influenza pandemics, scientists 
are trying to elucidate the steps that 
currently circulating H5N1 avian 
influenza viruses would need to take 
to become capable of efficient trans-
mission from human to human. 
In 1918, the H1N1 avian influenza 
virus subtype emerged, and the 
ensuing pandemic called the Span-
ish Flu killed an estimated 40–50 
million people worldwide. In sub-
sequent years, humans built up a 
degree of immunological memory 
to H1N1 influenza as it circulated 
in the general population, causing 
less severe yearly influenza epidem-
ics. Then, in 1957, another strain to 
which humans had no prior experi-
ence—the H2N2 influenza virus—
appeared and triggered a pandemic 
that resulted in the deaths of an esti-
mated 1–2 million people globally. In 
1968, the H3N2 subtype emerged, ruary 24, 2006 ©2006 Elsevier Inc. 667
yet another strain to which humans 
had no prior exposure; this pan-
demic resulted in the deaths of 
approximately 700,000 individu-
als. Since 1968, variants of H3N2 
have circulated to cause seasonal 
epidemics; in 1977, human H1N1 
viruses reappeared, and these also 
continue to circulate (Wright and 
Webster, 2001). 
The 1918 virus was an avian virus 
that adapted to humans through a 
series of point mutations (Tauben-
berger et al., 2005). In contrast, the 
1957 and 1968 pandemic influenza 
viruses were the products of reas-
sortment, that is, they derived three 
genes from an avian influenza virus 
and their remaining five genes from 
the previously circulating human 
influenza viruses (Wright and Web-
ster, 2001). 
The H5N1 virus was first recog-
nized in chickens in Scotland in 
1959. At an unknown point in time, 
the H5N1 avian influenza virus began 
to appear in poultry flocks in South-
east Asia, causing only mild symp-
toms of disease in birds before the 
mid 1990s. In late 1996, it became 
evident that the virus had mutated to 
a highly pathogenic form that could 
kill chickens within 48 hr, with a 
nearly 100 percent mortality rate. In 
1997, the first human cases of highly 
lethal H5N1 influenza occurred in 
Hong Kong; 18 people were infected, 
and 6 died. Public health authori-
ties in Hong Kong ordered a mas-
sive culling of poultry, which appar-
ently prevented further spread of the 
virus at that time. However, in early 
2003, the virus reappeared in a Hong 
Kong family who had recently visited 
mainland China. In late 2003, H5N1 
surfaced again, first in Vietnam and 
then Thailand (http://www.who.int/
csr/disease/avian_influenza). 
The highly pathogenic H5N1 strains 
of influenza currently circulating—pre-
dominantly in poultry—are primarily 
animal pathogens and already con-
stitute a true pandemic among chick-
ens. Whether the virus develops into 
a strain capable of spreading from 
human to human in an efficient and 
sustained manner, thereby trigger-
ing a human pandemic, will depend 668 Cell 124, February 24, 2006 ©2006 Eon how the virus evolves and adapts 
to new hosts. Since its re-emergence 
in Southeast Asia in 2003, the virus 
has appeared in poultry in at least 18 
countries and in multiple species of 
migratory birds. The virus also has 
been found in other animals, includ-
ing pigs, tigers, and leopards. The 
virus has infected at least 93 people 
and killed 42 people in Vietnam. As of 
February 9, 2006, there have been at 
least 22 human cases and 14 deaths 
in Thailand, 4 cases (all fatal) in Cam-
bodia, 25 cases and 18 deaths in 
Indonesia, 12 cases and 8 deaths in 
China, 12 cases and 4 deaths in Tur-
key, and 1 fatal case in Iraq, with the 
toll continuing to rise every week (see 
Figure 1).
H5N1 influenza viruses had origi-
nally circulated in wild birds without 
causing disease and without mutat-
ing into highly virulent forms. Omi-
nously, however, the currently circu-
lating H5N1 viruses appear to have 
the ability to mutate in domestic 
poultry to highly pathogenic forms. 
As the virus has infected chickens 
and other domestic poultry, it has 
become increasingly virulent and has 
achieved the capability of jumping 
species to humans and to other ani-
mals with lethal consequences. Most 
alarmingly, the virus now seems to 
be transmitted from poultry back to 
migratory birds and, for the first time, 
is causing disease in the migrating 
bird population. This unprecedented 
pattern of transmission is an impor-
tant reason why public health officials 
are watching the H5N1 virus carefully 
because it is a strain with the poten-
tial to cause the next influenza pan-




structed the entire coding sequence 
of the H1N1 virus that triggered the 
1918 influenza pandemic (Tauben-
berger et al., 2005). They found that 
this virus, presumably avian in ori-
gin, did not reassort with putative 
human viruses circulating at that 
time. Rather, the virus accumulated a 
series of mutations that enabled it to 
more efficiently infect and replicate in 
human cells, explaining its rapid prop-lsevier Inc.agation among humans. By compar-
ing sequences of the 1918 virus with 
known avian and human influenza 
viruses, it was possible to identify a 
set of 10 amino acid residues among 
the three viral polymerase proteins 
that are associated with the ability 
of the virus to infect and replicate 
efficiently in human cells. Thus far, 
the H5N1 virus has accumulated five 
of the ten changes in the encoded 
polymerase protein sequences that 
were found in the 1918 virus and are 
commonly found in human influenza 
viruses. This suggests that the H5N1 
virus may be accumulating changes 
associated with an increased likeli-
hood of human-to-human transmis-
sion (Taubenberger et al., 2005).
A Multifaceted Response
The 1918 pandemic caught pub-
lic health officials completely by 
surprise—it was not even known 
then that the illness was caused 
by a virus. Today, however, as we 
face the prospect of another glo-
bal influenza pandemic, we have 
a unique opportunity that did not 
exist in 1918. We have the tools to 
monitor genetic sequences of influ-
enza viruses as they evolve in both 
humans and birds. We also have the 
capacity to develop and manufac-
ture countermeasures against new 
strains of influenza. As we prepare 
for the possibility of the next pan-
demic influenza it will be important 
to optimize the use of available pub-
lic health measures and scientific 
tools and technologies. 
An effective response to H5N1 avian 
influenza virus or any emerging and 
re-emerging infection requires a com-
prehensive, multifaceted approach. 
Surveillance, public health measures, 
and biomedical research—including 
the ability to isolate infectious agents, 
decipher pathogenic mechanisms, 
and develop appropriate diagnostics, 
therapies, and vaccines—are all criti-
cal components of a multipronged 
response to emerging and re-emerg-
ing infectious diseases, including both 
seasonal and pandemic influenza. 
As noted, H5N1 avian influenza 
viruses are rapidly evolving patho-
gens with the potential to trigger a 
possible pandemic. It will be critical 
to maintain diligent surveillance of 
the virus in both animal and human 
populations in order to monitor its 
evolution and capacity to sustain 
efficient human-to-human spread. 
Isolation and characterization of the 
virus in real time are critical as we 
develop vaccines and antiviral drugs 
that are effective among the circulat-
ing viruses with potential to cause 
widespread disease. 
Antiviral medications such as 
oseltamivir and zanamivir have 
been shown to reduce the severity 
and duration of seasonal influenza. 
However, their efficacy in treat-
ing a potential influenza pandemic 
is uncertain. Therefore, a vaccine 
against circulating strains of the 
H5N1 virus will be critical in pre-
venting widespread transmission of 
the virus should it develop the abil-
ity to spread readily among humans. 
In this regard, techniques to rapidly 
isolate and sequence circulating 
influenza viruses have been devel-
oped. Using a technique known as 
reverse genetics, researchers in 
academia and industry have devel-
oped prototype vaccines against the 
H5N1 virus and are currently testing 
their safety and immunogenicity in 
human volunteers. In a recent clini-
cal trial, 451 healthy adult volunteers 
were vaccinated with two intramus-
cular doses of an inactivated H5N1 
vaccine produced by Sanofi-Pas-
teur. Preliminary data indicate that 
the vaccine was well-tolerated and 
induced an antibody response pre-
dictive of protection, albeit at high 
doses (unpublished data). A trial 
of the same vaccine among >260 
elderly volunteers is underway, with 
a third trial in pediatric volunteers 
planned for the spring of 2006.
Scientists also are investigating 
ways to increase the immunogenicity 
of H5N1 vaccines, including the use 
of adjuvants, employing intradermal 
rather than intramuscular administra-
tion, and developing live-attenuated 
vaccines. In this regard, a library of 
live-attenuated vaccines against all 
16 major avian influenza subtypes 
is being developed through a Coop-
erative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between Med-
Immune, Inc. and researchers at 
the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases. Once gener-
ated, production of these pre-exist-
ing stock vaccines could be scaled 
up and used to “pre-prime” individu-
als in an emergency situation while 
more specific vaccine formulations 
are being developed. Recent col-
laborative studies by researchers in 
the United States and China, involv-
ing genetic analysis of samples from 
13,000 migratory birds and 50,000 
domestic poultry, reveal that H5N1 
viruses have been circulating among 
both wild and domestic birds in 
China for the past 10 years. These 
viruses have evolved into distinct 
genetic clusters associated with par-
ticular geographic regions. The stud-
ies suggest that the virus originated 
in China and has spread to neighbor-
ing and distant regions over the past 
decade (Chen et al., 2006).
The World Health Organization, 
along with the World Organization for 
Animal Health (OIE) and the Food and 
Agriculture Association of the United 
Nations (FAO, 2006), are coordinat-
ing efforts to monitor transmission 
of the H5N1 virus throughout the 
world and to prepare for the possibil-
ity of an influenza pandemic. Activi-
ties include increased surveillance 
of viral evolution and transmission 
among wild birds, domestic poultry, 
and humans, confirmation of etio-
logic agents in symptomatic patients 
and contacts, vaccine development 
and distribution, and stockpiling of 
antiviral treatments. WHO oversees 
a network of laboratories that moni-
tor evolution of the H5N1 virus and 
prepare prototype vaccine strains 
for vaccine manufacturers. Currently 
ten countries have domestic vaccine 
manufacturers and several of these 
companies are developing pandemic 
vaccines. Although several countries 
have reported that efforts to vacci-
nate poultry are planned or under-
way, no companies are currently pre-
pared to produce pandemic vaccines 
commercially for use in humans. 
A major challenge to an effective 
response to influenza and the threat 
of a pandemic is the need to repair Cell 124, Febour fragile vaccine production enter-
prise. In the 1970s, more than two 
dozen pharmaceutical companies 
were licensed to sell vaccines in 
the United States. Today, only four 
are licensed to manufacture influ-
enza vaccine for distribution within 
the United States. It is important to 
develop partnerships among gov-
ernment, academia, and industry to 
increase the capability of developing 
new vaccine manufacturing tech-
nologies, such as cell-based culture 
techniques that will allow for greater 
flexibility and surge capacity in the 
production of vaccines. Indeed, it is 
essential for the U.S. Federal govern-
ment to partner with pharmaceutical 
companies to develop and sustain 
the manufacturing capacity for vac-
cines and therapies that can be made 
available in an expeditious manner 
in the eventuality of a pandemic. 
Equally important is the institution of 
policies that will provide incentives to 
vaccine manufacturers to enter and 
remain in business.  
Influenza and the threat of an influ-
enza pandemic present a unique 
challenge to public health and the 
biomedical research enterprise 
worldwide. Although available tech-
nology offers sophisticated tools with 
which to monitor the evolution and 
characteristics of the virus, it will also 
be essential to use our knowledge 
and resources wisely. Increased 
cooperation among governments and 
public health agencies will be critical. 
The sharing of epidemiological data 
and deployment of countermeasures 
in the geographic areas where they 
are most likely to result in disease 
containment are equally important. 
Ongoing efforts in basic biomedical 
research also are critical to the com-
prehensive pandemic preparedness 
effort, including studies to under-
stand viral pathogenesis; the ongo-
ing search for new antivirals; new 
platforms and targets for vaccines, 
such as recombinant DNA and vec-
tor approaches; as well as improved 
vaccine manufacturing methods. 
We do not know whether H5N1 
will be the virus that triggers the next 
influenza pandemic. However, as we 
increase our efforts to improve our ruary 24, 2006 ©2006 Elsevier Inc. 669
capacity to respond to this virus, we 
also will increase the likelihood that we 
can efficiently and effectively respond 
to any future pandemic influenza as 
well as to any emerging or re-emerg-
ing pathogen that threatens mankind. 
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